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The Japanese yakuza, officially bōryokudan, are the organized crime groups 
of Japan. The Japanese National Police Agency (NPA) defined bōryokudan in a 
1992 law as "any organization likely to facilitate its members to collectively or 
habitually commit illegal acts of violence" (NPA, 2018, para. 1). Beyond this legal 
definition, yakuza represents an influential subculture as a social organization 
rather than simply a form of an illegal enterprise.  
The yakuza included more than 80,000 members that were part of around 
3,000 different groups at one point (Gragert, 1997). The largest syndicates include 
Yamaguchi-gumi, Inagawa-kai, and the Sumiyoshi-kai, which encompass over 
70% of the membership (Hill 2014). As of 2017, however, police estimated that 
only around 35,000 were in membership (NPA, 2018b), and a continued decline in 
membership over 13 years has been reported (Ryall, 2018) As brought up by 
Adelstein, however, to a degree members are also less visible and as said by one 
boss, “We’re not vanishing. We’re restructuring”(2017, para. 7). Although 
membership has overall seen a decline, in many ways the yakuza are still very 
present, although they have transformed over time in response to a changing 
relationship with the government and even Japanese society itself. Even if the 
organization were to magically disappear today, it would permanently leave an 
influential cultural trail through films, magazines, and more.  
The yakuza, beyond their common ties to organized crime, also share 
cultural values, social norms, and general history. The culture behind yakuza has 
ties from the 17th century and historically was preceded by groups of bakuto and 
tekiya, or gamblers and traveling peddlers (Hill 2014). Members identify with the 
history of machi-yakko, or of “servants of the town” that resisted the pillaging and 
harassment of the unemployed samurai of hatamoto-yakko (Kaplan & Dubro, 2012; 
Gragert, 1997; Fisher, 2012). The ethos of resisting the oppression of powerful 
elites as folk heroes resonates through the values and sense of identity in yakuza, 
for instance through the emphasis on chivalry or ninkyō (Hill 2014). Indeed, Hill 
noted, descendants of historical outcasts burakumin are perceived to be more likely 
to join yakuza (2014). This ethos has played an important role in how the yakuza 
frame themselves and their activity. 
Internal Structure 
 For the yakuza, the internal structure can be characterized particularly by 
hierarchical relations and familial ties. Indeed, being organized hierarchically is 
also specified as an essential feature of a boryokudan group by the Japanese 
government in article 3 of the original Anti-Boryokudan law (Reilly, 2014). These 
central elements are critical in why members are initially attracted and find 
themselves loyal in the long-term to the yakuza. Gragert (1997) listed three main 
reasons someone might join the yakuza: “(1) the offering of a surrogate family; (2) 
provision of a vehicle for upward social mobility; and (3) the sense of belonging to 
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a group” (p. 167). The hierarchical structure is integral to the inner organization of 
yakuza, involving the division between “young men” (or wakashu subordinates) 
and their underlings (“children” kobun or “enlisted men” kumi-in) (Hill, 2014; 
Gragert, 1997). At the same time, like many other organized crime groups (von 
Lampe, 2016), a sense of family and loyalty is emphasized. In the yakuza, this is 
seen through oyabun-kobun and kyōdai relationships (father-son and brotherhood, 
respectively). 
Yakuza is made up of separate syndicate groups that exhibit, as explained 
by Gragert (1997), either a “pyramidal power structure” (e.g. Yamaguchi-gumi) or 
“federation or conglomerate structure” (e.g. Sumiyoshi-rengo) (p. 165). For the 
former, this entails a leadership hierarchy of a head kumicho, four shatei, and eight 
wakashira-hosa. In the “head family” of the Yamaguchi-gumi group, there was one 
central gang leader and around 90 leadership positions, such as senior executives 
that would meet monthly (Hill, 2014, p. 236). In contrast, in the other structure, a 
kumicho is chosen among gang bosses to represent the organization as a whole. In 
other words, the primary difference between these two structures is that in the 
federation one, gangs within the syndicate hold more individual autonomy 
(Gragert, 1997). 
Money-Making 
 Most yakuza activity occurs at the sub-group level in which members are 
expected to create shinogi sources of income to pay monthly dues—or jōnokin—to 
the organization (Hill, 2014). The total income of yakuza as calculated by the 
police, in what Hill calls an over-conservative estimate, was once 1.3 trillion yen, 
or 11.8 billion USD (2014). Hill estimated the annual income of Yamaguchi-gumi 
alone in 2004 to be 1.27 billion yen or 11.5 million USD (2014). For such vast 
profits, there have been different avenues for yakuza to generate such earnings.  
Gambling has historically been a key element of yakuza, but the yakuza 
have changed over time in this regard. Yamaguchi-gumi casinos were found to have 
once earned monthly some 100 million yen or 900,000 USD (Hill, 2014). It is 
estimated that in 1989, over 20% of yakuza revenue came from gambling; this was 
only 7% eleven years later (Hill, 2014). Nonetheless, gambling has not altogether 
been replaced, and sports/racing betting, electronic pinball, and dice games hosted 
by yakuza have persisted.  
Tied to gambling appears another potential avenue of money-making: 
although many modern businesses are actively unfriendly to yakuza, some 
pachinko parlors (for electronic pinball) still rely upon yakuza for protection 
services (Hill, 2014). Protection has proved an unreliable means of revenue, 
however, because legislation (such as one passed in 2011) has illegalized otherwise 
law-abiding businesses from paying for a gang service (Ryall, 2018). 
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The yakuza has also had involvement in construction as a middleman broker 
for workers. In the past, this has sometimes meant stifling public resistance over 
environmental issues, as was seen in the case in Minamata in the ‘60s concerning 
mercury poisoning. This also helped set the foreground for sōkaiya scams to take 
place throughout the 70s and early 80s in which professional scammers (almost a 
third of which were found to be yakuza members) blackmailed corporations that 
they would leak compromising information at annual general meetings, or, for a 
protective fee, help prevent such leaks (Hill, 2014). 
Many yakuza members do not see drug-dealing as a moral avenue for 
money-making. Indeed, in 2011 the leader of Yamaguchi-gumi Tsukasa Shinobu 
indicated that his organization had forbidden it (Adelstein, 2017). Nonetheless, the 
involvement of yakuza in drug-dealing shows that it has, however, still become a 
significant part of yakuza activity. Around 50% of the amphetamine-related arrests 
in 2009 were yakuza affiliates, and, according to the police at the end of the ‘80s, 
85% of the yakuza were involved in the drug trade (Hill, 2014). Even by 2014, still 
over half (55%) of stimulant-related arrests were yakuza members, and around 45% 
of them were Yamaguchi-gumi members alone (NPA, 2015).  
Continuing on, extortion and fraud are a significant method of money-
making for the yakuza. Indeed, the police called the yakuza “a particularly 
ingenious money launderer” (NPA, 2015), and in 2016, around one-fifth of cleared 
money laundering cases were attributed to yakuza members (NPA, 2018a). They 
also have traditionally had a role in the hospitality industry, or mizushōbai (Hill, 
2014, p. 240).  Additionally, Adelstein suggested, cybercrime is an emerging area 
of profit (2017), as well as involvement in the sex trade, drug/weapon selling, and 
the entertainment industry (Ryall 2017; 2018). The diversity of money-making 
activity is illustrated in the figure below, which shows the different areas in which 
yakuza members are most often arrested.  
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Figure 1.  
NPA Statistics on Boryokudan Arrests 
 
Note. Reprinted from “White paper on police 2017,” by National Police Agency, 2018, p. 30. 
Culture 
 As established by von Lampe, shared norms and values of a crime group 
are advantageous as a way to establish and foster trustful and “criminally 
exploitable ties” between members (2016, p. 107). Yakuza culture—which 
involves certain symbols, rituals, rules, and values—plays a role in maintaining the 
organization’s sense of family and its sense of trust. Furthermore, being a 
recognizable yakuza, Hill noted, made it easier to find willing business partners 
(2014). On a similar note, language, particularly using “Archaic Japanese or heavy 
slang,” is a cultural feature used as a practical instrument of maintaining secrecy 
(Gragert, 2017, p. 164). Consequently, it can be noted that there are often ways 
certain cultural attributes also hold some type of strategic value. 
Visibility is one reason why tattoos or irezumi have historically become so 
important to yakuza members. In the 1970s, around 70% of the yakuza were 
tattooed. Back in the 17th century, in the birth of yakuza, tattooing in Japan had 
been tied to criminality. Yakuza portrayal in ‘70s film helped reaffirm this 
association (Fifield, 2017). Tattooing, however, is relatively less common today, 
due to the cost, pain, and discrimination associated with getting tattoos (Fifield, 
2017; Hill, 2014). 
 Also associated with the yakuza is the practice of yubitsume, or cutting off 
a finger; this has become increasingly less common as an effort to decrease 
visibility but also sometimes due to the associated health risks (Hill, 2014; Bosmia 
et al., 2014). In 1993, however, over 40% of yakuza members were reported to have 
participated in this practice (Bosmia et al., 2014). According to Fisher (2012), this 
practice is emblematic of a larger culture of violence. Other perspectives focus on 
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the sentiment of loyalty and dispute resolution (or atoning for one’s mistake) that 
is tied to yubitsume (Bosmia et al., 2014). 
Alcohol is also important culturally to yakuza. In fact, one former member, 
as reported by Hill, tied liver disease for the cause of death for around a third of 
yakuza members (2014). Drinking is also key as a device for socialization and 
bonding.  
Relationship with the Government 
 From the standpoint of the government, in addition to challenging the state’s 
monopoly on gambling services and the carrying out of other illegal economic 
crimes, divisional yakuza disputes and resulting conflicts have become a major 
point of concern (NPA, 2018b; Adelstein 2015). Over 17,000 arrests were made in 
2017 alone (NPA, 2018b). The relationship of the yakuza with the government is 
especially important to consider since both the size of yakuza groups and the type 
of activity they pursue are highly influenced by the state.  
How the State has Benefited Yakuza 
 The formation and growth of the yakuza is tightly intertwined with the 
capabilities of the Japanese government. “According to Gambetta,” von Lampe 
explained, “a demand for protection” arises when “[market participants’] interests 
are not sufficiently safeguarded by the state” (2016, pp. 46-47). The Japanese 
yakuza is such a case.  
In the early 1800s, under a weak government, yakuza bosses were relied 
upon to resolve local disputes. Continuing on, early in the Meiji restoration, yakuza 
paramilitaries, such as the one led by Shimizu no Jirōchō with almost 500 people, 
played a militaristic role (Hill, 2014). Also during this time, the yakuza was an 
instrument for the state for suppressing labor organizing and resistance (Gragert, 
1997). Post-WW2 saw a growth in the yakuza as a result of the costs of war 
(weakened state role, for instance). In the Korean War, the yakuza played a role as 
labor brokers for construction and shipping, particularly important industries at the 
time (Hill, 2014). In more recent contexts of the ‘80s, yakuza’s involvement in 
dispute resolution in civil affairs or minbō has been considered a “necessary evil” 
when legal channels were seen as inactive or inefficient through, for instance, debt 
collection or traffic dispute settlements (Galeotti, 2014). In these cases over time, 
the role or more accurately lacking role of a state directly and indirectly benefited 
organized crime groups.  
How the State Has Hindered Yakuza  
 Although the yakuza have “demonstrated an affinity to political groups' 
(von Lampe, 262) through, for instance, its right-wing and ultranationalist political 
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ties in the 1890s and 1930s (Gragert, 1997; Galeotti, 2014), its relationship with the 
government has also been an antagonistic one in many regards. The government 
can have a powerful impact on organized crime groups. Early on, the state targeted 
gambling in the Meiji era (Hill. 2014). Similarly, in the ‘60s, illegal gambling 
ventures were further pursued by government forces. Another source of criminal 
activity, sōkaiya scams were addressed in the ‘80s and paying them became illegal 
(Hill, 2014). Indeed, from 1982 to 1983, according to the police, cases of sōkaiya 
scams decreased from 6,738 to 1,682 (Galeotti, 2014).  
Japan’s 1991/1992 Anti-gang law is one of the more important laws in 
targeting yakuza that successfully dramatically harmed yakuza membership 
(Gragert, 1997; Reilly, 2014). Initially passed in 1992, over twenty years the law 
would be adjusted five times to better target the yakuza (NPA, 2015). For instance, 
a 2007 revision targeted the cultural practices of finger-cutting and tattooing as well 
as purported programs and policies to help and encourage members to leave the 
yakuza. Additionally, the expanded "damage liability provision" of this revision 
meant leaders could be held culpable for the cost of destruction caused by 
underlings (Reilly, 2014, p. 814), which meant leaders could no longer escape 
culpability through the division of labor and separation of tasks. By 2011, 
substantial changes were put into action which criminalized yakuza interaction and 
prodded business contracts to specifically alienate and exclude yakuza (Adelstein, 
2017). In 2012, a new revision made it easier for police to arrest extorters, not 
needing to carry out a cease-and-desist order as a warning first (Reilly, 2014).  
Although certain action has targeted organized crime in general, law 
enforcement also has sometimes targeted certain groups as well as certain activity 
(such as gambling, sōkaiya scams, and extortion). For instance, in 2009, the 
National Police Agency notably targeted the Yamaguchi-gumi faction Kodo-kai 
(Adelstein, 2017). Moreover, the 2016 conflict between Rokudaime Yamaguchi-
gumi and Kobe Yamaguchi-gumi has been cited as a motive for the Japanese 
government to intensify measures against firearms (NPA, 2018a). With these 
several approaches through legislation and law enforcement, yakuza activity to 
generate profits was stifled and accountability for crimes was heightened.  
Involvement of other Governments 
 Although yakuza are Japanese-based crime groups, they can lead to 
transnational implications, and nondomestic governments also may play significant 
roles. In the battle against bōryokudan, the government’s efforts also extend beyond 
the domestic area; for instance, the National Police Agency’s 2015 white paper 
listed border control as one area in which yakuza activity was targeted. Moreover, 
as an organized crime group, the yakuza have been actively deterred by foreign 
governments such as the United States. The US. froze assets belonging to two 
Yamaguchi-gumi members in 2012 (Reilly, 2014), and in 2016, the U.S. put 
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sanctions against the Kobe Yamaguchi-gumi syndicate (U.S. Department of the 
Treasury, 2016; Adelstein, 2017). 
The prosecution of organized crime by the U.S. has also influenced the 
Japanese government in certain regards in combatting the yakuza. For instance, as 
noted by Reilly (2014),  the Anti-Boryokudan law was influenced by RICO in the 
U.S. Also, according to Reilly (2014), the political movement of a ‘War on Drugs’ 
in the United States also influenced Japan in constructing the Anti-Boryokudan 
Law.  
Survival of Yakuza 
The yakuza response in the early 90s to the Anti-Boryokudan Law was 
largely of resistance then reorganization (Reilly, 2014). Even in the aftermath of 
the passing of this law, Reilly (2014) implied the existence of a sometimes 
cooperative relationship between yakuza and police, based in bribery and 
corruption. Over time, membership has grown and waned. Indeed, in 1963 there 
were more than 184,000 members, and the police reported only around 78,600 
members in late 2010 (Hill, 2014; NPA, 2018b).  
The activity and functions of yakuza groups have also adapted and been 
reconfigured over time as a result of government prosecution. For instance, sōkaiya 
scammers shifted to other areas, repurposing themselves as “analysts, fake political 
groups, or burakumin-liberation movements” and found new inventive ways to hide 
illegal payments (italics in original, Hill, 2014, p. 241). On a similar note, Reilly 
(2014) noted a responsive shift from mostly involving "regular" to "associate" 
participants in the yakuza. Even for those surviving regular members, training is 
generally much shorter (they used to be trained for around 6 to 36 months) (Hill, 
2014). In general, yakuza organizations have moved away from gambling to other 
activities such as drug dealing, corporate extortion, and so forth. The role of the 
government and its relationship to the yakuza has been multi-layered--- the state 
has pursued significant efforts in persecuting and stifling the crime group but the 
state’s moments of weaknesses have created the climates under which new yakuza 
schemes have unfolded.  
Relationship with Society 
 There is mixed literature concerning the relationship of the yakuza with 
Japanese society, which in part can be explained by a more recent shift of 
unfriendliness toward the criminal group and an “anti-Yakuza movement” (Reilly, 
2014, p. 806). According to Fisher (2012), yakuza life is often romanticized and 
they have achieved some sense of mainstream legitimacy. This can be seen in "fan 
magazines" which portray yakuza activity and culture (Reilly, 2014, p. 805). More 
conservatively, Gragert (1997) noted that the yakuza have achieved “some degree 
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of public acceptance” (p. 163); this is reflected by how members, although this 
largely fell out of practice following 1992 legislation, openly mentioned yakuza 
involvement on business cards and signs. On the other hand, the Yamaguchi-gumi’s 
code of conduct of 2009 explicitly instilled a more secretive approach, including 
not using the syndicate’s crest on business cards (Reilly, 2014).  
Although visibility has decreased in the rise of new legislation against 
organized crime, yakuza have not necessarily gone under the public radar.  When 
the yakuza does draw public attention, they place a lot of effort into promoting a 
certain narrative and aim for positive publicity. This is done, for instance, with the 
ethos connected with machi-yakko as a way to frame itself in social contexts in a 
positive light (Reilly, 2014). Similarly, the yakuza has a history of doing outreach 
during natural disasters such as in the 1995 Great Hanshin Earthquake or the 2011 
Great Tohoku Earthquake (Reilly, 2014).  
Conclusion 
 The yakuza, like many organized crime groups, are not simply ad hoc, 
purely economic groupings. They create a social community and a specific 
subculture. They have their own ideology and set of values that lead them to avoid 
certain crimes and embrace others more fully. It is also because of these underlying 
social contexts that yakuza members cannot be fully made obsolete regardless of 
police efforts and that yakuza membership has not been completely outlawed in the 
nation. Although law enforcement efforts and new legislation has clearly hindered 
yakuza activity, they have also adapted and restructured alongside these changes. 
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